Collective irrigation reloaded. Re-collection and re-moralization of water management after privatization in Spain by Sanchis Ibor, Carles et al.
 Document downloaded from: 
 

























Sanchis Ibor, C.; Boelens, R.; García Molla, M. (2017). Collective irrigation reloaded. Re-






Collective irrigation reloaded. Re-collection and re-moralization of water management after 1 
privatization in Spain 2 
 3 
Abstract   4 
In recent decades, water has been subjected to different commodification and de-5 
collectivization processes. Increasingly, this is also affecting collective irrigation water 6 
management. Critical analysis of this privatization and de-collectivization wave in the 7 
irrigation sector has mainly focused on neoliberal institutional policies and market-8 
oriented legislation. However, subtly and silently but equally determinant, the adoption 9 
of water-saving technologies is fostering the penetration of private enterprise and 10 
market-based governance into these hydro-social settings. This paper discusses this 11 
phenomenon through a case study of the community of Senyera in Valencia, Spain, 12 
tracking the privatization and subsequent contestation and re-takeover of water 13 
management by irrigation system users. The article shows how privatization removes 14 
users’ autonomy in the name of common well-being, and increases irrigation costs in a 15 
context of little transparency. But the case also highlights users’ capacity to re-value and 16 
re-signify their past collective action, remembering and ‘re-membering to’ the 17 
collective. Senyera water users critically and reflexively analyse privatization, 18 
reconstruct societal relationships around and embedded inside the new technology, and 19 
re-collectivize and re-moralize irrigation management in a new hydro-social scenario. 20 
 21 
Keywords:  Collective action, water privatization, water management, moralization of 22 
technology, drip irrigation. 23 
 24 
 25 
1. Introduction. Community water control: the last bastion or a new market niche? 26 
 27 
Since the 1980s, pressured by the emergence of neoliberalism, water has been subjected 28 
to commodification and privatization worldwide. Water pricing, market creation, and 29 
privatization of water supply or sanitation services are some components, frequently 30 
inter-related, of this de-collectivizing wave (e.g., Bakker, 2005; Castro, 2007; Harvey, 31 
2003; Swyngedouw, 2005).  32 
Privatizing public drinking water supply services has been the most frequent 33 
phenomenon, and undoubtedly the most strongly resisted. In fact, an increasing 34 
remunicipalisation of water in different-sized cities has responded to widespread 35 
dissatisfaction generated by private action, inseparable from increasing equity, 36 
environmental and public health concerns (Pigeon et al., 2013; Lobina et al. 2015). At 37 
the same time, many countries’ neoliberal policies have grown into more covert 38 
privatization, commodification and marketization actions with subtler discourses and 39 
‘participatory’ strategies, mainly in a neo-institutionalistic vein (Roth et al., 2015; 40 
Duarte-Abadía and Boelens, 2016).     41 
Private enterprise has made up for their retreat from these cities by intensifying their 42 
action in other territories where companies discern business possibilities. This, then, is 43 
no neoliberal decline, but just a spatial variegation defining the current post-neoliberal 44 
scenario (e.g., Bakker, 2013; Yacoub et al., 2015). Aligned with this hypothesis, this 45 
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paper underscores how, in recent years, private suppliers are seeking new market 46 
niches, attempting to position themselves in other sectors such as irrigation 47 
management, which have so far been difficult to penetrate. 48 
During the closing years of the 20
th
 century, the arrival of the private companies 49 
penetrating the agricultural water sector was partly curbed by the scientific and 50 
political recognition achieved by collectively managed irrigation systems (Ostrom, 51 
1992; Wade, 1994; Roth et al., 2015). However, irrigation did not entirely elude water 52 
commodification; compared to the drinking water sector, irrigation has experienced 53 
other means of de-collectivization, in terms of policies, scenarios, protagonists, 54 
strategies and impacts. For one, many countries’ irrigator communities have been 55 
affected by water rights privatization and market establishment (e.g., Ahlers, 2010; 56 
Boelens, 2015; Bossenbroek, 2016; Scott and Raschid-Sally, 2012). Moreover, 57 
numerous large agri-business companies or other economic sectors have been detected 58 
driving water grabbing in traditional irrigation systems, in Latin America, Asia and 59 
Africa (e.g., Birkenholtz, 2016; Mehta et al., 2012; Swyngedouw, 2005; Yacoub et al., 60 
2015). Finally, several companies took advantage of public irrigation management 61 
transfers (IMT) to user associations to position themselves as new co-suppliers of water 62 
service or undertake operation and maintenance functions (Vermillion, 1997; Garcés-63 
Restrepo et al., 2007).   64 
Since the early 21
st
 century, several regions of the world have experienced more 65 
forceful penetration by service companies into irrigation water management. 66 
Occasionally, companies merely provide operational services under maintenance and 67 
service contracts, but in many other cases they have undertaken construction of 68 
networks and subsequent water resource allocation and distribution among users 69 
(Darghout et al., 2007). This penetration is camouflaged by the neoliberal catch-phrase 70 
of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) to dodge the negative connotations that 71 
‘privatization’ has acquired. Spain and other countries also use “externalization” as a 72 
euphemism for this outsourcing. 73 
Despite their recent materialization, a number of countries have already assessed this 74 
new ‘public-privatizing’ irrigation critically. In these cases, public-private partnerships 75 
have forgotten ‘the commoners’ themselves as a rightful partner, neglecting or side-76 
lining the interests, knowledge and context of local water user communities and 77 
families. According to the cases recently analysed in Morocco, state-market-expert 78 
nexus has caused unequal socioeconomic impact among smallholders; unfair sharing of 79 
burdens, benefits and risks between public and private partners; environmentally fragile 80 
sustainability; and severe negative impact on local users’ water management capacities 81 
(Houdret, 2012; Houdret and Bonnet, 2013).  82 
The literature on this privatization and de-collectivization of irrigation has focused 83 
fundamentally on institutional policies and market-oriented legislation, paying little 84 
attention to transformation of technological systems and water devices (e.g., drip 85 
irrigation) as a factor driving privatization. Further, although there is abundant literature 86 
examining protests and mobilizations against neoliberalization or privatization in 87 
agriculture, there is a remarkable absence of studies addressing the construction of re-88 
collectivizing alternatives in response.   89 
This paper is a pioneering assessment of such conversion experiences – from 90 
community to private management and then back to the ‘community reloaded’ in 91 
traditional Spanish systems. This is happening in a national context in which 92 
management privatization initiatives have been tightly linked to modernizing irrigation, 93 
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mainly introducing water saving technologies. We have chosen the case of Senyera 94 
(Valencia Region) to analyse this process, because this community had a first phase of 95 
management privatization – tied to the technology changeover to ‘drip’ irrigation – and 96 
then regained community irrigation system control by farmers. 97 
Information was collected through interviews conducted in January and June 2014, 98 
June and December 2015, and June 2016 with former and current members of the 99 
irrigator community governing board; former and current users’ association technicians, 100 
and the private company (Tecvasa); former and current majors of Senyera; farmers from 101 
Senyera and farmers from the neighbouring water users’ associations. The authors held 102 
winter interviews especially focusing on obtaining an account of the irrigation system 103 
and technological facts including all the empirical and economic data. Summer 104 
interviews were held by the authors together with three groups of 4-5 students co-105 
tutored by the authors. These findings were expressed in three respective reports (De 106 
Beer et al. 2014; Führen et al. 2015; Borghuis et al. 2016). Some of the key actors were 107 
interviewed several times each year, and focus group meetings and collective interviews 108 
were held with some of these actors.     109 
The next section first examines the cultural and moral dimensions underpinning 110 
collective irrigation management, which are quite different from the aims and thinking 111 
of private management. Next, we introduce how implementing drip irrigation systems 112 
has become the vector carrying privatization into community irrigation. Then we reflect 113 
on ‘(re)moralization’ of water management and infrastructure as a response to this 114 
privatizing technology changeover, expressed analytically and socio-politically by the 115 
water user community’s ‘recollective efforts and struggles’. The third section will 116 
examine the illustrative case of Senyera, detailing the processes of privatization and ‘re-117 
collecting’. The final section presents our conclusions. 118 
 119 
2. Drip irrigation as a Trojan horse: subtle re-moralization of management and 120 
infrastructure 121 
 122 
“Tools are intrinsic to social relationships. Each person relates to society 123 
through actions and the tools effectively mastered to carry out those actions. To 124 
the degree that one actively masters one’s tools, their shape determines his/her 125 
self-image” (Ivan Illich, 1984:90). 126 
 127 
2.1. Collective irrigation institutions, technology and morality 128 
 129 
User self-managed irrigation systems often express prolonged interaction between water 130 
user families and their environment, shaping socio-ecological systems in diverse 131 
contexts. Their collective management institutions have often lasted over time, clearly 132 
demonstrating their robustness and resilience (e.g., Glick, 1970; Maass and Anderson, 133 
1978; Mabry, 1996; Roth, 2014). These systems are based on normative frameworks 134 
and collective water rights featuring social, cultural and moral values that are different 135 
from modern techno-economicist management frames and practices. Their multi-136 
dimensional, contextual nature makes them inaccessible or unappealing to private 137 
enterprise and official government agencies, because they transcend conventional 138 
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econometric, functionalist and bureaucratic parameters (Cleaver, 2000; Hoogesteger, 139 
2012; Roa-García, 2014; Romano, 2017).  140 
Collectives self-managing their water use systems are usually socially diverse 141 
entities whose members – differentiated by ownership rights, gender, status or ethnic 142 
group – are united by mutual dependence to develop, use and manage their water 143 
resources, by a sense of collective water identity (Boelens, 2011, 2014). Each member’s 144 
rights and obligations are derived from common rights and duties, and in the event of 145 
conflict there is great collective interest in resolving it quickly, to restore effective 146 
cooperation (Garrido, 2011). This collective contractual reciprocity (Boelens, 2011, 147 
2015), historically rooted, is totally different from market-based contractual 148 
arrangements (Reimer et al., 2008); it builds on trust, community morality, the history 149 
of shared water defence, the creation and re-creation of common water property, and 150 
long-term social cohesion. This is the backbone of community systems.  151 
The moral nature of collective irrigation has been discussed by various authors, 152 
among others as a spin-off from the moral economics theory developed by Thompson 153 
(1971) or Scott (1976) or the theory of legal pluralism (e.g., Benda-Beckmann et al. 154 
1998; Roth et al., 2015). For example, Ferri (1997) and González-Alcantud (1998) have 155 
deciphered the normative or moral principles that traditionally governed irrigation ditch 156 
management in Valencia and Andalucía; Gelles (2000), Trawick (2001), and Boelens 157 
(2014, 2015) have critically explored such moral visions in the Andes; Arellano (2014) 158 
in New Mexico; Cleaver (2000, 2017) and Eldidi and Corbera (2017) in various African 159 
contexts; among many others. This moral involves the existence of a (collectively built 160 
but contested and continually adapted) ethos that imbues community norms, guides 161 
operational procedures, water access and allocation rules, and decision-making 162 
privileges, and which is a reference for farmers’ behaviour (see Boelens, 2015; Roth et 163 
al., 2015). These collective moral frameworks for water coexists with situations of 164 
social inequality and internal conflicts (Mayer, 2002; Calatayud, 2008; Perreault, 2008; 165 
Sanchis-Ibor, 2016). So, rather than idealizing these moralities, there is a need to 166 
examine them with a constructively critical approach to each particular case. 167 
What is crucial is that, beyond just legal constructs, locally prevailing (hybrid) moral 168 
frameworks as expressed in water rights, obligations, operational norms and governance 169 
practices become manifest concurrently in hydraulic technology, normative 170 
arrangements and organizational frameworks, all ingrained in particular political-171 
economic and cultural-symbolic settings. And vice versa, hydraulic infrastructure 172 
contains human norms and morals, and power relations. This means that water 173 
management and hydraulic infrastructure are culturally, historically and politically 174 
moralized and also steer moral and social action.
1
  175 
Such a moral dimension of irrigation materializes when designing infrastructure and 176 
norms for collective action. Communities, when designing their canal layouts, establish 177 
where to conduct the water and who not to give water; canal capacities, control 178 
structures and gate openings establish maximum water flows to be taken; hydraulic 179 
blocks and schedules require particular forms of organization and distribution, etc. Both 180 
technology and management rules are amalgamations of ethical principles and social 181 
justice, defining how burdens, risks and benefits are shared (Boelens and Vos, 2014; cf. 182 
Beccar et al., 2002; Mosse, 2008; Veldwisch et al., 2009; Meehan, 2013). Clearly, this 183 
                                                          
1
 This morality is often also integrated into local supernatural beliefs (González-Alcantud et al., 1995, 
Boelens, 2014; Arellano, 2014), manifested in ritualization or sacralisation of practices or key places in 
the hydraulic infrastructure. 
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means that hydraulic designs bear a significant moral cargo: this moralization of 184 
technical design (see Latour 1991, 1994; Winner 1993) steers the ways in which 185 
hydrosocial systems and artefacts facilitate or enforce ‘right-ness’ and obstruct ‘wrong-186 
ness’ (as seen in the designers’ eyes).  187 
Obviously, local self-governing water user associations are not the only parties who 188 
can ‘moralize’ their water management and infrastructure. When local water securities, 189 
moralities and rights profoundly differ from external designers’ moralities, as for 190 
example reflected in State laws and market-oriented water policies, they are commonly 191 
seen as “unruly,” “disobedient,” and “intangible”, so officialdom often discursively 192 
labels them as “inefficient” (Boelens and Vos, 2012; Boelens and Seemann, 2014; 193 
Gelles, 1998; Perreault, 2014;  de Vos et al., 2006). In most of the global South but 194 
equally in the North, State authorities set out to abolish extra-legal water management 195 
rules and rights in order to move towards modernity, framing this as ‘moralization’ of 196 
water control (Gelles, 2000; Boelens and Seemann, 2104). Such legal and expert 197 
moralization is commonly masked as a benevolent, missionary effort to make water use 198 
technology efficient, to rationalize farmers’ irrational water rights, to modernize archaic 199 
forms of organization, following the moral obligation of technical and social engineers 200 
to help make water society modern.  201 
These considerations are fundamental when addressing irrigation modernization 202 
affecting numerous communities worldwide in recent decades. When modernizing 203 
systems, the designer’s morally-loaded messages are inscribed in these socio-technical 204 
networks geared to create social and political order (Latour 1992). Engineers, planners 205 
and constructing companies delegate functions, duties, ethics and values to the water 206 
facilities. Socio-technological ‘scripts’ (Latour 1991) or ‘codes’ (Winner 1985) often 207 
conceal power relationships and naturalize the politics of water system design and 208 
management – as ‘hardened morality’ they seek to enforce particular moral and political 209 
behaviour. In the words of Pfaffenberger, “technological activities bring entrenched 210 
moral imperatives into prominence” (1992:504). Or, as Callon argued, “engineers 211 
transform themselves into sociologists, moralists or political scientists at precisely those 212 
moments when they are most caught up in technical questions” (Callon, 1991:136). As 213 
Pfaffenberger showed, implementing externally-developed socio-technological systems 214 
induces not only new artefacts, “but also a new world of social relations and myths in 215 
which definitions of what ‘works’ and is ‘successful’ are constructed by the same 216 
political relations the technology engenders.” (1988: 249). These new societal 217 
relationships, differing aims and moralities, that have become embedded in hydraulic 218 
artefacts and management forms, obviously differ from those developed endogenously 219 
by historical entities for collective irrigation management, and consequently tend to 220 
enter into conflict when modernizing irrigation. 221 
 222 
2.2. Drip modernization and irrigation management externalization 223 
 224 
The recent, fast and widespread dissemination of drip irrigation follows the above-225 
described socio-technological pattern. In the last two decades, this technology has 226 
spread through numerous regions of the world, as a tool to reduce agricultural water 227 
demand. Countries such as India, Spain, China or the United States have introduced this 228 
tool on more than 1.6 million hectares (ICID, 2016). Drip irrigation has been spread by 229 
a pitch prepared by stakeholders such as the water device industry, official agencies and 230 
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global policy institutions, fundamentally grounded in discourses and concepts of water 231 
saving and efficiency. 232 
However, in recent years, many authors have questioned whether drip irrigation 233 
actually achieves a net saving of water (e.g., Playán & Mateos, 2006; Perry et al. 2009; 234 
Lecina et al., 2010; Van der Kooij et al., 2013). Further, in certain contexts, it has 235 
negative effects on energy consumption (Jackson et al., 2010; Rodríguez-Díaz et al. 236 
2011) and using it overall will increase irrigation costs (García-Mollá et al., 2014). In 237 
general, this tool needs commodified resources, market conditions and support 238 
measures to succeed (Dumont et al., 2014; Sanchis-Ibor et al., 2017; López-Gunn et al. 239 
2012).  240 
Therefore, Garb and Friedlander (2014) and Venot et al. (2014) call for a broader 241 
vision of such changes, and for studying irrigation technology as an integrated array of 242 
material and social elements (e.g., through ‘technography’, Jansen & Vellema, 2011). 243 
The first studies conducted in Morocco indicated that, when localized irrigation systems 244 
are introduced (sprinkler, drip) this significantly alters maintenance and management 245 
operating procedures, institutional structures, agrarian economies and livelihoods, and 246 
irrigation knowledge and culture (e.g., Venot et al., 2014, 2017; Bossenbroek, 2016). 247 
Impacts on community systems have included individualizing collectives, losing local 248 
autonomy, and generating dependence on centres of expertise and intermediaries with 249 
external knowledge, financing and material inputs (Bossenbroek, 2016). 250 
 In Spanish irrigation, we have also detected major changes in collective irrigation 251 
management institutions after these techniques are adopted. First of all, different 252 
irrigator communities have merged their networks with an eye to reducing water use 253 
and minimizing management costs, transferring control upward to a supralocal level 254 
outside the community (Sanchis-Ibor et al., 2016). In cases without upscaling, we have 255 
also observed a general trend to centralize management authority and procedures, 256 
among others as a consequence of introducing telecontrol systems in irrigation 257 
distribution (Ortega-Reig et al., 2017a).
2
 258 
This technological change unavoidably shifts social and cultural handling of 259 
irrigation, facilitating entry by private enterprise into the domains of Spanish irrigator 260 
communities. Implementing this technology – mass-promoted and State-subsidized 261 
(García-Mollá et al, 2014) – has yielded a new market niche for private companies. 262 
Therefore, drip irrigation has acted as a Trojan horse, enabling the private sector to 263 
penetrate some long-standing irrigation systems, which had been an international 264 
benchmark of collective self-managed irrigation (Ostrom, 1990; Garrido, 2014).  265 
Obviously, there is a continuum in these formulas of penetration by private 266 
enterprise, ranging from specifically externalizing certain maintenance tasks, all the way 267 
to supplanting the irrigator community’s essential functions. Many irrigator 268 
communities have decided to engage specialists to maintain their systems, often turning 269 
to private companies, which entails a major break with tradition for Spanish collective 270 
irrigation management institutions. In such cases, such as the Royal Canal of Júcar, 271 
institutions do not lose control over their traditional functions, although there is some 272 
centralization of these management structures and procedures (Ortega-Reig et al., 273 
2017a). 274 
                                                          
2
 The Spanish case (Ortega-Reig et al., 2017a), like Morocco’s (Benouniche et al., 2014), also features 
bricolage and subtle transformation (Cleaver, 2017) by which irrigators adjust the technology to their 
own aims – often diverging from the goals of the State and the agents promoting drip irrigation (Ortega-
Reig et al., 2017b). 
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However, on other occasions, we have detected full turnover of community irrigation 275 
to private companies, which perform functions that used to be collective, impose 276 
‘modern’ practices and legitimize ‘rational’ knowledge. In these cases, age-old practices 277 
that underpin essential cultural values for coexistence of rural communities have been 278 
replaced by entrepreneurial management methods following rootless criteria of 279 
efficiency and pursuit of profit. This subtle sociotechnical transformation has received 280 
little attention to date, since most critical studies have focused almost exclusively on 281 
neoliberal policies and legal-administrative changes to examine privatization of 282 
irrigation management. 283 
The Trojan horse gets in when irrigation system transformation begins. Private 284 
companies responsible for implementing new water works, connive with local elites or 285 
public administration who promote and subsidize them, incorporating maintenance 286 
service into their construction contracts, as with urban water supply (BOT, Build-287 
Operate-Transfer). This way, after inaugurating the new irrigation system, they control 288 
it. This was the pattern in Senyera, which we analyse below, but similar formulas have 289 
been used in developing new irrigation systems in many other regions of Spain, such as 290 
the Segarra-Garrigues Canal (Catalunya), the Ontiñena Ditch (Aragón) or Adaja River 291 
irrigation (Castilla-León). 292 
These water-technology and institutional-policy changes do not happen without local 293 
objections, which sometimes succeed. This happened, for example, in Càrcer 294 
(Valencia), where a private enterprise set up a new irrigation system and agreed with the 295 
irrigator community governance body to take over management from them. However, 296 
so many farmers mobilized against giving up management that they finally kept the 297 
private company from taking over. Critical scholarship tends to emphasize open 298 
opposition to water policy mega transformations (e.g., Hommes et al., 2016; Sneddon 299 
and Fox, 2008; Stoltenborg & Boelens, 2016) and also hidden, non-violent resistance in 300 
day-to-day life, through strategic, hybrid adaptations (e.g., Boelens, 2015; Hoogesteger 301 
et al. 2016; Mena et al., 2016. Cf. Kerkvliet, 2009; Scott, 1990). However, there are few 302 
studies of irrigator associations opposing privatization of their collective management 303 
who, after experiencing de-collectivization, decide to take back control from the private 304 
sector to re-create community management, as happened in the case of Senyera that we 305 
will analyse next. 306 
What we want to highlight in the following case is the importance and power of 307 
remembrance; i.e., recollecting the past (the pre-drip collective water use society) in 308 
order to both examine the present (significantly influenced by experiencing privatized 309 
drip management) and envision the future (return to a renewed form of collective 310 
control). Perreault, in his article on water memory and collective experience as 311 
environmental justice, argues that, “as a representation of the past, memory is always 312 
also a representation of the present, and a reflection of contemporary realities, which in 313 
turn informs political demands. In this way, memory may be seen as a vital conceptual 314 
tool for envisioning environmentally just futures” (2017). Indeed, thought begins with 315 
remembrance, as Hannah Arendt stated
3
 . However, remembrance, we argue, relates not 316 
only to ‘remembering’ but equally to ‘re-membering’: becoming a renewed ‘member’ 317 
                                                          
3
 In On Revolution, Arendt argues for the importance of societies’ recollecting and conceptualizing 
experiences essential for their political constitution, in order not to fall prey to de-politicized discourse 
and manipulation; “If it is true that all thought begins with remembrance, it is also true that no 
remembrance remains secure unless it is condensed and distilled into a framework of conceptual notions 
within which it can further exercise itself” (Arendt 1963:220). Here we show that this assertion is not 
confined to historic states and empires but also a fundamental need and practice in farmer communities.     
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of the (reworked) hydrosocial network, by re-thinking and re-conceptualizing thought, 318 
by reflecting on experiences. As we will analyse, Senyera farmers ‘re-membered 319 
themselves’, as a result of questioning the ongoing privatization experiences in their 320 
community and actively working towards the re-collectivization of their hydrosocial 321 
network, with ‘re-collective morals’. 322 
In our analysis, we frame Senyera farmers’ efforts as ‘recollecting water control’. To 323 
‘recollect’ refers to remembering (building on past experiences of community and 324 
privatized control), to re-membering (renewing people’s membership of the renewed 325 
human/nonhuman irrigation network), and to re-collectivizing (taking back collective 326 
control and autonomy). Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines ‘recollective’ as “to bring 327 
back to the level of conscious awareness / to remind oneself of something temporarily 328 
forgotten / to bring an image or idea from the past into the mind”. Simultaneously it 329 
refers to “having the power of recollecting”.4 Our conceptualization therefore also refers 330 
to the medieval Latin word recollectus, the past participle of recolligere, “to gather 331 
again”. As we will examine in the next section, Senyera farmers, collectively 332 
remembering the past and questioning the present, have decided to engage in the 333 
process of ‘re-commoning’ water governance, by recollecting their self-governance 334 
history and by recollecting what went wrong afterwards. 335 
 336 
3. Senyera: from community-controlled gravity irrigation to privatized drip 337 
service and back, to ‘community drip 2.0’ 338 
 339 
3.1. Collective management of gravity irrigation 340 
 341 
Senyera is a small village, with 1169 inhabitants, located near the confluence of the 342 
Júcar and Albaida rivers. Since the medieval period, the fields of Senyera have been 343 
irrigated with water from the Albaida River, through the inter-community Comuna 344 
d’Ènova channel. This channel divides into three branches, one of which, the Séquia del 345 
Terç, supplies the fields of Senyera – currently 116 hectares — and Castelló de la 346 
Ribera (Figure 1). All the irrigators owning farms in Senyera are members of the 347 
Sindicat de Regs, an association for collective management of irrigation and defence of 348 
their common interests.   349 
Agriculture there is practiced by elderly farmers (nearly half are over age 65), part-350 
time work, and small fields (averaging half a hectare). The most common profile is a 351 
farmer who is the retired owner of a plot smaller than half a hectare. For the last 20 352 
years, citrus fruits – mainly oranges – have been practically the only crop from this 353 
municipality. The total area planted was 140 ha early this century, but it decreased to 354 
116 ha (387 plots) as a result of urban development projects – only partially executed – 355 
of which 77.5 ha are currently irrigated (283 plots) (Jiménez-Bello et al., 2007, 2010).  356 
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Figure 1: Senyera irrigated area and the drip network 358 
 359 
 360 
Remembering the time of community water control “before the company entered”, 361 
water users explain that their collective control and non-commoditized institutions and 362 
resource management were viewed as indispensable to secure and defend all their 363 
livelihoods. So, in everyday water and non-water related activities, Senyera families 364 
constructed and re-affirmed social and territorial bonds, shared infrastructure and a 365 
common water rights framework.  366 
Historically, water rights were proportionally attached to land property, and water 367 
distribution followed a rotational schedule. The regador (ditch rider) hired by the 368 
community organized irrigation turns according to the schedule and farmers could 369 
arrange small adaptations though, in general, the one who had been waiting longest 370 
would receive water first. “Although people have different memories of the facts, they 371 
look back at it as an equitable system” (Borghuis et al., 2016:18). Water management 372 
transparency was accounted for by the regador’s presence in bar El Moreno during the 373 
summer and a bulletin board during winter time. Being there at a fixed time every day, 374 
being known by every farmer, made management accessible. The bar’s bulletin board 375 
posted the schedule, and in the off-season (or during wet years) the regador’s water 376 
management skills were not required. Farmers could irrigate on demand, after picking 377 
up a stick (‘palet’) and depositing three euros with the bartender, certifying a farmer’s 378 
irrigation turn. Farmers had to stick the palet on their field and when they finished, the 379 
following farmer to irrigate picked it up and paid him the deposit. Information was 380 
quickly shared between farmers, and smooth negotiation, socialization and transparency 381 
of irrigation scheduling contributed to satisfactory water allocation – farmers knew 382 
when to expect their water, even during droughts. 383 
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Informal decision-making happened in bars, as they were (and still are) the social 384 
centre of the village for farmers. A meeting place every morning for the esmorzar 385 
(Valencian breakfast), where they would eat and drink together – a place for farmers to 386 
discuss the status of their fields, the water, and any needs and problems they have.  387 
Issues discussed at the bar and in the field were subsequently translated into proposals 388 
for the board and assembly meetings for formal decision-making (Führen, et al., 2015). 389 
Satisfaction and confidence ranked high among the farmers. User obligations, such as 390 
the collective labour input and water fees (€180 per hectare/year) were perceived as fair, 391 
as everyone was able to afford them and farmers knew what they were paying for and 392 
that the irrigator community did not want to make any profit. Overall, irrigation was an 393 
appreciated part of daily public life. 394 
Senyera’s water infrastructure and its embedded allocation rationality, therefore, 395 
reflected not just the region’s agro-climatic and geophysical circumstances but equally 396 
the prevailing social, cultural and political forces of ‘community’. Water allocation 397 
rules were entwined with a diversity of social norms in Senyera community settings, 398 
inside and outside the domain of functional water control. These include overall 399 
community rights and obligations, family relationships, political structures, and 400 
historically generated organizational patterns. As such, Senyera’s common property 401 
owners embedded their individual rights — to use water and infrastructure and 402 
participate in local water governance decisions — in collective system ownership.  403 
Clearly, this common property management and conservation in Senyera’s irrigation 404 
system was grounded in mutual dependence among mostly smallholder users, vis-à-vis 405 
external power and adverse environmental conditions. Throughout Senyera’s history, it 406 
has entwined and related to the simultaneous shaping of moral-normative structures, 407 
organizational-managerial relationships, cultural-political alliances, and the Séquia del 408 
Terç’s material hydraulic structure. In a range of expressions, families explain that their 409 
community system thus generated and reaffirmed a mode of simultaneous belonging to 410 
the community, to the water and to each other – a ‘hydraulic identity’ and ‘hydraulic 411 
culture’ (Boelens, 2014, 2015). 412 
 413 
3.2. Drip irrigation implementation and privatization 414 
 415 
This water culture broke down in 2004, when the community received a proposal from 416 
the Senyera Municipality, firmly interested in completely transforming the historical 417 
irrigation network into a modern drip irrigation system. The project was brought before 418 
the Sindicat General Assembly for approval, and the town’s mayor and a commercial 419 
water expert attended to explain and advocate for the project, to be implemented on a 420 
BOT basis. The overall opinion of farmers, now, is that they were misinformed, 421 
manipulated, and persuaded by the discursive power of the modernization and 422 
privatization dream. The community assembly was attended by only 55 of the 235 423 
members, who approved the project with 47 yea votes. Out of the five bids submitted by 424 
different companies to implement the transformation, they chose Tecvasa, the most 425 
expensive, but the only one offering financing. Some irrigators subsequently disagreed 426 
with the Tecvasa plan, as expressed by a former president of the community who said: 427 
“The new mayor did not want anyone else’s ideas. He had his own project. He wanted 428 
this to bring him fame, votes and popularity. The pros and cons were secondary. At any 429 
price, drip irrigation should be installed.... The ‘quorum’ was outspokenly illegal, but he 430 
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managed to start his project made by a so-called ‘engineer’ who was not independent, 431 
and the company was commissioned for more than 1 million Euros”.  432 
Once the Assembly had agreed, the company pressured for the paperwork to be done 433 
quickly and, in fact, in a few days they signed the contract – including full assignment 434 
of system management for 10 years – and the work began. Tecvasa soon also took over 435 
control and management of drinking water supply from the Municipality, and treated 436 
farmers with little transparency. Some irrigators said that the company claimed it would 437 
contribute 50% of the costs but actually this came from government grants to modernize 438 
irrigation. Community leaders who had posts in 2004 also told us of their difficulties in 439 
trying to understand the legal wording of the contract they had to sign with the 440 
company. As one of the members of that government board said: “The contract was 441 
drafted so that it was impossible to understand. I sat down to read it with the dictionary, 442 
but never figured out what it meant”. Other interviewees said that the proposed contract 443 
that Tecvasa presented for the community assembly was substantially different from the 444 
contract subsequently submitted to be signed. 445 
Some irrigators who opposed the transformation, regardless of their varied 446 
perception of whether drip irrigation systems were useful or not, radically rejected 447 
turning over system management for 10 years: “We don’t like outsiders who tell us 448 
what to do. How can such a big company understand a small village like this? Here we 449 
understand each other, which is highly preferable to a company from outside the 450 
village” (quoted in Führen, et al., 2015:17). Nevertheless, they could not stop the legal 451 
process. The contract signed with the company committed them to a mandatory 452 
payment, and would force irrigators to indemnify the company if they decided to 453 
abandon the project. This left no room to discuss or reconsider the community’s 454 
position. 455 
Throughout 2004, the drip irrigation was set up, and the new system started 456 
operating. Most (but not all) farmers switched to drip irrigation on their fields, and were 457 
charged for this by the private company. The former president of the Sindicat says it 458 
was not entirely free choice because Tecvasa pressured farmers. Of all farmers who 459 
made the conversion to drip, none indicated water saving as an incentive, although this 460 
policy discourse had justified drip irrigation modernisation. Rather, ease of watering, 461 
avoiding night irrigation, reducing time spent on irrigating, and ease of adding fertilizer 462 
were their motives.   463 
The new system had a 98,000 m
3
 reservoir to store river water and a distribution 464 
network supplying 57 sectors (Figure 1). It had 52 multi-outlet hydrants and a total of 465 
331 intakes. The infrastructure soon revealed operating deficiencies due to improper 466 
design and construction. The location of the reservoir and the pumps chosen to 467 
pressurize the network – submersible pumps – were a poor choice with low energy 468 
efficiency. It was the start of a long-term community headache, operationally and 469 
financially, because farmers had to repay most of the construction and all operating and 470 
maintenance costs. Further, the network was over-sized, as often happens in irrigation 471 
modernization projects: to make them ‘profitable’ (Boelens, 2015; Sanchis-Ibor et al., 472 
2016, 2017): Tecvasa based the system design on a larger land area, to present a lower 473 
cost per hectare and facilitate approval. This resulted in higher construction costs than 474 
necessary. 475 
 476 




In 2006, a new governing board took over for the irrigator community, and asked the 479 
majority agrarian sindicato in the region for a report to assess possible reversal of 480 
agreements with Tecvasa. The report disappointed the irrigators, confirming that they 481 
had no legal way to recover irrigation management until the contract expired in 10 482 
years. 483 
As time went on, irrigators became increasingly frustrated, as network design and 484 
management problems arose. Poor construction of certain stretches could not withstand 485 
their design pressure and piping often burst. Further, irrigators began having problems 486 
with some crops. Drip irrigation was not effective in watering older trees, because it did 487 
not cover the entire root system. This also affected production in particular in those 488 
irrigated zones with older trees. De Beer et al. (2014:18) observed: “According to the 489 
president, the mayor and the water lawyer, the aim of the modernisation was to increase 490 
yields. None of the farmers mentioned an increase in yield, and as orange prices sagged, 491 
the financial gain became lower and lower. Some farmers recognized a drop in their 492 
yield after implementing drip, because the drip system could not reach the extended root 493 
systems of old trees that were adapted to surface irrigation”. 494 
Irrigators’ disenchantment also grew when they saw how they lost autonomy and 495 
transparency in the entity’s administration. Tecvasa designated several system-operators 496 
to manage the infrastructure, following a watering schedule made by a computer 497 
program developed for the company by a team of university experts. There was no 498 
direct contact between the system operators and the farmers concerning water 499 
allocation, which made it difficult for farmers to consensually arrange, negotiate and 500 
adapt daily irrigation turns to their needs. Different cultures clashed, as one farmer 501 
expressed: “I had a conflict with a Tecvasa engineer and said: you know a lot about 502 
books, but not about the field”, while characteristically Tecvasa blames the tight-knit 503 
community for not functioning according to standards: “The community needs to 504 
develop professionally, but there are social and political forces that inhibit this” (quoted 505 
by Borghuis et al. 2016:16) 506 
The Sindicat lost most of its operational authority, since Tecvasa was in charge of all 507 
management decisions. “Nobody came to speak to us. Tecvasa was like a satellite 508 
controlling us”, a farmer explained. The current president observes: “We continuously 509 
had to remind Tecvasa that we are the owners, that they are only service providers, but 510 
they would not listen and understand”. Tecvasa also prevented farmers from seeing the 511 
irrigation meters, to ascertain whether the volume of water reaching their fields matched 512 
the company’s invoice: “Each sector has a measurement box in which each field has its 513 
own measurement device, so each farmer has his own meter. These boxes cannot be 514 
entered by the farmers, the system is operated by Tecvasa, the operator is the only one 515 
who can control and monitor these measurement houses” (De Beer et al., 2014:17). The 516 
impossibility of checking irrigation meters obliged the governing board to closely 517 
monitor billing, which interviewees said detected invoices with errors, always in the 518 
company’s favour. 519 
Fundamentally, Tecvasa followed market morality. Contrary to the deep-rooted 520 
collective water control and livelihood morality of the Senyera farmers: “... for Tecvasa, 521 
drip implementation in Senyera was a test case. They executed the project to expand 522 
business in irrigation. They seized opportunities in Senyera to get involved in drip 523 
irrigation due to the subsidies available” (De Beer at al. 2014:24) – and to see how 524 
much profit they could skim from the smallholder community. One of the main factors 525 
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bothering irrigators was the rising costs of irrigation. O&M costs tripled, from 180 €/ha 526 
to 572 €/ha. However, in addition to these costs the works were amortized: 4918 €/ha 527 
were to be paid, over ten annual receipts delivered to the irrigators. The total cost of 528 
irrigation, consequently, was multiplied six-fold over the 10 years that Tecvasa 529 
managed the irrigation system, reaching 1064 €/ha. The company also made hefty 530 
profits by introducing fertirrigation systems. Fertilizer prices, seldom more than 400 531 
€/ha before the transformation, reached 1680 €/ha on plots incorporating drip irrigation.   532 
For the smallholder majority, living under privatized and commodified management 533 
was harsh. The context of low orange prices and high irrigation costs because of 534 
Tecvasa management left little profit margin. A farmer owning an average plot of 0.5 ha 535 
made barely 600€ a year, not counting labour and pesticide costs, so in some cases it 536 
was too little to pay for picking the oranges. The contract signed with Tecvasa was also 537 
especially expensive for the community when users paid late. If some irrigator failed to 538 
pay in time, the company did not have to collect, but the Sindicat as a whole had to 539 
cover any shortfall and pay the company directly. The company also imposed an anti-540 
abandonment clause, so farmers had to pay even if they gave up on their crops and 541 
water rights. 542 
Despite the major problems with the management and service provided, Tecvasa 543 
tried to promote this case as exemplary, collaborating with various university 544 
researchers. Studies were conducted on deficit irrigation (González-Altozano, 2007), a 545 
GIS was designed to integrate agronomy and water to manage Irrigator Communities 546 
(Jiménez-Bello et al., 2007); several technical assessments were made to increase 547 
efficiency in distributing fertilizers (Jiménez-Bello et al. 2010); and improvements were 548 
developed to minimise energy consumption (Jiménez-Bello et al. 2011). However, 549 
technicians working for Tecvasa said improvements in irrigation costs from this work, 550 
reducing energy costs, were not passed on to the irrigators. They only increased the 551 
company’s profit margins. 552 
The company also profited by cutting back irrigation system maintenance to a 553 
minimum. According to the Sindicat’s governing board, the company engaged no 554 
insurance for the infrastructure and neglected the facilities, especially in the last few 555 
years, so badly that they left various elements out of service when the contract ended. 556 
Nearing the end of the 10-year contract, farmers’ overall opinion was that “technical 557 
operation and maintenance can be done far cheaper, and it should be done by someone 558 
with a farming passion, from the community itself” (De Beer et al., 2014:21). By 559 
contrast, Tecvasa was a firm believer in the experts’ syndrome, wanted to continue, and 560 
assumed that it had made the farmers sufficiently dependent upon its expert services – 561 
“Tecvasa is sure that it will be difficult for the water users to manage the drip system by 562 
themselves” (De Beer et al., 2014:21). After 10 years of “BOT” neoliberal discourse, 563 
this may raise eyebrows with respect to the meaning of and intentions behind the “T”.  564 
For 10 years, farmers lost their profit margin, transparency and autonomy. The loss 565 
of autonomy and dissatisfaction with the company’s management discouraged irrigators 566 
from attending general assemblies. The one with decision-making power, Tecvasa, only 567 
occasionally appeared at these meetings. As a water user expressed: “Tecvasa just came 568 
whenever they wanted”. In the eyes of Tecvasa, however, they refused to join the 569 
general assemblies because they considered it to be “... a fake democracy: out of the 570 
whole membership, there are only a few who attend” (quoted in Borghuis et al. 571 
2016:21). However, at the last general assembly of the 10-year management 572 





3.4. Dismantling the Trojan horse: the return to collective management 576 
 577 
Finally, in early 2015, when the contract expired, the community decided to regain 578 
control over the irrigation system. Though Tecvasa wanted to continue its profitable 579 
job, the current president explains “We refused. We were fed up with them!”. The 580 
Sindicat hired a local technician to manage the irrigation system and began taking 581 
different actions to reduce irrigation costs. The results from the first year of collective 582 
management have been hugely positive, a tremendous economic relief for Senyera’s 583 
farmers. The community has cut irrigation management costs to 468 €/ha, a reduction of 584 
18.1%. However, the costs of injecting fertilizers in the irrigation system have also 585 
dropped by 67.8% (from 1680 €/ha to 541 €/ha) thanks to the governing board’s 586 
actions. At the same time, farmers say they have observed substantial improvement in 587 
their trees’ conditions with the new fertilizers. “The trees are green now”, as one 588 
community member characteristically told us. And despite the substantial cutting of 589 
costs, the Sindicat has ended 2015 and 2016 fiscal years with a surplus in their accounts, 590 
to be used for collectively decided purposes. In the same vein, Borghuis et al. (2016:25) 591 
state that profits are not taken away by Tecvasa but are invested in the collective 592 
system: “Even though it is generally believed that the open market will make services 593 
cheaper, Senyera community self-management shows the contrary”.  594 
Though, as we have explained, the drip system imposes major social requirements 595 
for use, and moral scripts, the farmers’ conscious transition towards ‘recollective water 596 
control’ shows that technology’s ‘hardened morality’ is not cast in concrete. 597 
Reproduction in the user’s society, of norms and social relationships as embedded in 598 
Tecvasa’s externally designed irrigation technology, is not a deterministic one-way 599 
process. Senyera water users show that irrigation technology is not an autonomous 600 
agent that can dictate the patterns of human social and cultural life. As Pfaffenberger 601 
argued, the use, operation and outcomes of sociotechnical designs and networks can be 602 
challenged; its original scripts “do not provide the only way to get the job done” 603 
(Pfaffenberger 1992:498). For example, recollecting experiences and re-thinking the 604 
system, the farmers wanted more flexibility in water conduction and application 605 
artefacts. The irrigation system of Senyera is now based on two irrigation types: both 606 
surface and drip. For surface irrigation and flooding the fields, a secondary canal 607 
provides the water that enters through small gates or paletes. Alongside the local drip 608 
technician, the regador has been re-installed and is the person in control of the surface 609 
system. As Borghuis et al. explain: “The farmers contact him to request an irrigation 610 
turn, for which the farmer can choose to let him open/close the gate at field level or do it 611 
themselves. Farmers using drip irrigation also have access to surface irrigation, which 612 
they use during hot periods” (2016:14). Both the reservoir and the community well 613 
(only used in case of drought) are accommodated to be able to provide water to both 614 
surface and drip irrigation.  615 
Moreover, the farmers interviewed express huge satisfaction at recovering collective 616 
management of their irrigation – “Now we manage it. We are proud to have the system 617 
back in our own hands”. When the automated drip irrigation system breaks down the 618 
system operator manually controls the water allocation and the farmers talk directly to 619 
him if they want particular changes (e.g., an extra irrigation turn). Face-to-face (or 620 
direct phone) contact with the system operator has been re-established, the system 621 
operator enjoying trust and closeness similar to the former regadores. Farmers express 622 
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faith in both the execution of the water control tasks and in payments of their dues, 623 
since they can now easily read on the bills what amounts they have been charged for: 624 
“Now we have more work, but it is far better. Now we work for ourselves. Now the 625 
operator works for us and gives us all the information. This was not the case during 626 
Tecvasa. It is not only a question of money; it is also a question of pride” (farmer 627 
quoted in Führen, et al., 2015:16). Interestingly, when the board suggested to lower the 628 
technician’s wage, the farmers opposed this, stressing the fine relationship between 629 
system operator and users. 630 
This also revived meetings at the bar, both informal and formal, ordinary and 631 
extraordinary. Discussing their modes of water governance, water rights and allocation 632 
practices, and infrastructure, it shows that at the heart of the matter is autonomy in 633 
decision-making, transparency and closeness, fair obligations and prices, and flexible 634 
use and operation of technology. Users feel that they can develop and practice their own 635 
norms, that they have been able to master and re-moralize their technology and system 636 
management. This has recovered the climate of trust that had been broken by privatizing 637 
management. This is what we have highlighted with the notion of ‘recollecting oneself’: 638 
“To use one's memory to become aware”, and in the end “To become aware of one's 639 
immediate situation or purpose after a distraction”.5 Senyera’s efforts and struggles are 640 
not just against privatization but also for a renewed hydrosocial network. They express 641 
that their renewed community identity, adapted sociotechnical system, shared water 642 
governance and regained water users’ autonomy are grounded in recollective 643 
consciousness and re-membrance. 644 
 645 
4. Conclusions. Re-moralizing and recollecting water management 646 
 647 
Reforming and renewing irrigation technology unavoidably redesigns the social 648 
dimension of irrigation. Even though neither ‘the expert designers’ nor ‘the users’ are 649 
monolithic moral and normative blocks with standard interests and assumptions, but 650 
complex networks often accommodating non-aligned values, norms and visions, 651 
infrastructure changes do in fact change norms and organizations, and can therefore 652 
alter their intangible values. 653 
When these changes happen within collective management bodies, by their own 654 
decision and under autonomous control by users, interactive, two-way adaptation 655 
occurs. On the one hand, the community applies or modifies technology according to 656 
their moral criteria and matches the new infrastructure to their needs, by intervening in 657 
or supervising engineering design to reform the irrigation system, or later, by 658 
introducing adjustments and creating their own particular usage protocols. On the other, 659 
conversely, the adopted technology may induce significant changes in community 660 
structure and dynamics, often unexpectedly, which oblige the entity to reorganize to 661 
adjust to or take advantage of the new hardware’s demands and potential. 662 
The case of Senyera could have fit into these parameters, since most farmers had no 663 
significant objections to implementing the new technology, although they did not share 664 
the aims usually associated with this irrigation technology (‘optimizing efficiency’). 665 
Rather than saving water or increasing production, farmers in Senyera, mostly elderly, 666 
wanted the convenience offered by this technology – mainly to stop having to irrigate at 667 
                                                          
5
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night. However, in Senyera the new technology was assimilated through a different, 668 
sudden, conflict-ridden process. First, change of technology and management was not 669 
by community initiative, but proposed by outside agents, with goals and morality 670 
completely alien to the collective farmers’ entity. Next, above all, because technological 671 
change was accompanied by privatizing management, dispossessing some fundamental 672 
rights, and breaking down their daily practices, irrigators perceived this as invasive, and 673 
it prevented any gentle adaptation. 674 
Management privatization both externalized and expropriated Senyera water users’ 675 
own social and material properties. This process is more far-reaching than just 676 
economic expropriation: not only part of the products of the irrigation process and the 677 
means of production are expropriated, but also the local definitions of labour place, 678 
labour time and labour rhythm. Next, in Senyera, locally existing skills and knowledge 679 
regarding water design and use have fallen prey to this process of profound 680 
expropriation. Existing norms were challenged concerning the organization of labour to 681 
operate and maintain the system, and local agreements regarding the distribution of 682 
rights and obligations.  683 
As the Senyera case shows, the issue of communities’ managerial independence 684 
versus ‘outside’ political-operative control was defined not only by (neoliberal and/or 685 
modernizing) legal provisions and organizational structures, but also by the very details 686 
of technical irrigation design. In Senyera, the network design prevented users from 687 
seeing irrigation meters, or defining the irrigation turn schedule (computerized) so 688 
system transparency was lost, breaking long-standing bonds among irrigators and 689 
between them and the regador, and thereby the foundations for users’ trust of the 690 
system. 691 
Tecvasa had the right to decide about schedules, flow rights, water distribution and 692 
the choice and quantity of fertilizer in the water. Water users maintained their rights to 693 
water shares but their right to use and control the infrastructure was withdrawn, as they 694 
did not have access to the distribution facilities and thus were not able or allowed to 695 
operate the drip irrigation system by themselves. This power, driven by the criteria of 696 
maximizing business profits, with the lack of transparency and an iron-clad contract, 697 
transferred high operating costs to irrigators, kept maintenance investments to a 698 
minimum and generated no return for users from technological improvements that were 699 
gradually incorporated into the irrigation system. Even from an exclusively economic 700 
perspective, contrary to neoliberal discourses about private, free-market management, 701 
Senyera’s experience shows how collective action administers irrigation more 702 
efficiently than giving up management to a private enterprise. Much of this advantage is 703 
due precisely to the shared collaboration morality and quest for the common well-being, 704 
which outsourced management cannot provide, because they need to maximize 705 
industrial profit. This is due, ultimately, to an idiosyncrasy that Tecvasa never grasped. 706 
The contract was not extended for several good reasons: high system operation and 707 
maintenance costs, the lack of transparency and access to operation facilities, and 708 
disputes about legitimacy. Furthermore, there was a strong drive to return to communal 709 
autonomy and self-governance, through a process of re-collection. Farmers remembered 710 
and reworked their social practices, their informal networks and the benefits of 711 
collective action. They were still proud of their identity, more strongly united by the 712 
invasion by an outside agent that had taken over control of their irrigation system. 713 
Farmers re-membered themselves by activating and renovating their management 714 
network, recovering the unwritten social norms, and achieving an unprecedentedly high 715 
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level of participation in the general assemblies. They also re-membered themselves by 716 
making the drip technology their own, by adapting the hardware to their needs and 717 
combining localized irrigation with periodic floods through the old gravity network. All 718 
of this resulted in a re-commoning process, taking back autonomy, self-governance and 719 
collective action. The hydro-social system has been re-moralized according to ancient 720 
principles and practices that govern commons in the region since medieval times, but 721 
assimilating in it new hardware.    722 
 723 
 724 
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